FT, Wolfgang Münchau: Italy debt burden is a problem for us all

 Wolfgang Münchau, FT

We need extreme and co-ordinated policy to make it possible for Italy to ultimately stay in the eurozone

Perhaps the biggest question facing the economic stability of Europe is what happens if Italy continues to stagnate as it had done for the past 15 years. Will everything just continue as it is now, just a little bit more depressed?

I think it is high time to address the consequences of failure with more clarity than is usually done. Put bluntly, Italy’s economic position is unsustainable and will result in eventual debt default unless there is a sudden and durable change in economic growth. At that point, Italy’s future in the eurozone would also be in doubt – and indeed the future of the euro itself.

What we are seeing in Italy is the brutal dynamics of debt deflation – where the fall in the price level raises the real value of debt. Between 2007 and 2013, the ratio of Italian public sector debt to gross domestic product rose from 103.3 per cent to 132.6 per cent according to Eurostat figures. For this year, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development expects it to rise to 137.5 per cent.

If Italy continues to stagnate in 2015 and 2016, the debt-to-GDP ratio will be heading towards 150 per cent of GDP. /.../

We are in a situation where we need a lot of extreme and co-ordinated policy action to make it possible for Italy to grow, service debt and ultimately stay in the eurozone. But policy so far has been neither extreme nor co-ordinated. Matteo Renzi, Italian prime minister, has promised radical reform, but not yet delivered. However, this is not enough. Italian debt sustainability requires policies at eurozone level that have so far been ruled out. This is where the eurozone’s success or failure will be decided.

Jeigu Europoje ir toliau trūks ekonominės paklausos, didžiausia valstybės skola užsienio valiuta pasaulyje nebus sumokėta.

Eurozonos likimas spręsis Italijoje.

Kaip gelbėjo eurą

Financial Times artėjančių rinkimų į Europarlamentą proga publikavo jaudinančią esė kaip Europos nomenklatūra "gelbėjo" zoną nuo suirimo.

Gelbėjo susitarę, kad krizės metu visokie statutiniai ir demokratiniai apribojimai neturi būti kliūtimi didžiam tikslui, todėl galima atlikti vieną kitą perversmą. Vokietija leido Europos centriniam bankui (ECB) vykdyti ekonomikos stabilizavimo veiksmus mainais už paramos gavėjų "struktūrinių reformų" kontrolę.

Sodrios detalės, neviešinti faktai, "žmogiškas veidas".

“Das ist nicht fair.” That is not fair, the German chancellor said angrily, tears welling in her eyes. “Ich bringe mich nicht selbst um.” I am not going to commit suicide.

For those who witnessed the breakdown in a small conference room in the French seaside resort of Cannes, it was shocking enough to watch Europe’s most powerful and emotionally controlled leader brought to tears.

But the scene was even more remarkable, those present said, for the two objects of her ire: the man sitting next to her, French President Nicolas Sarkozy, and the other across the table, US President Barack Obama.

It would be the low point in a brutal, recrimination-filled night, one many participants would recall as the nadir of the three-year eurozone crisis.

Nelengvas tai buvo procesas... Malonaus skaitymo.

Demokratijos lopšyje

Graikija pirmininkauja Europos sąjungai.
Graikų premjeras Altonis Samaras vaiposi klausydamas, kaip Nigel Farage kalba apie Graikijos problemas, o patį vadina marionete.

Farage: We Are Now Run By Big Business, Big Banks and Big Bureaucrats

HT +Andrius Misevičius

Vokietijos atsakomybė

LEVY instituto post-keynesistai savaitgalį organizuoja konferenciją Atėnuose. Žiūrint į dalyvių sąrašą ir pranešimų temas, renginys bus turiningas. Temų ratas - nuo Vokietijos "nuopelnų" euro krizei aptarimo, iki pasidalinimo islandiškomis "kaip mes juos pasiuntėm ir nieko neatsitiko" patirtimis.

(Konferencijoje dalyvaus ir Már Guðmundsson, Islandijos centrinio banko vadovas. Skaitys pranešimą “Iceland’s Crisis and Recovery: Are There Lessons for the Eurozone and Its Member Countries?”)

Iš LEVY blogo kopijuoju Jörg Bibow interviu - pranešimo apie Vokietijos politikos klaidas anonsą.

You have been critical of German policy. How does it really affect the rest of Europe? In what ways does it cause harm to the peripheral economies?

Yes, indeed, German policy bears foremost responsibility for the euro crises and German policy is key to Europe’s future. Germany is Europe’s largest economy. For that reason alone whatever happens in Germany inevitably significantly impacts the eurozone economy. For instance, when Germany prescribed itself an extra dose of wage repression and fiscal austerity in the early 2000s, this had rather fateful consequences for the currency union. For one thing, stagnant domestic demand in Germany constrained its euro partners’ exports to Germany. For another, stagnation in Germany provoked some degree of monetary easing from the ECB, monetary easing which was both too little for Germany but too much for the euro periphery where wages and domestic demand were thereby propelled further. In other words, Germany undermined the ECB’s “one-size-fits-all” monetary policy stance. This happened alongside cumulative divergences in intra-area competitiveness positions, current account imbalances and the corresponding buildup in foreign asset and debt positions. Together this meant that the currency union was going to face trouble as soon as those imbalances would start to unravel. I started warning of these developments in 2005, but the euro authorities were sleeping at the wheel for many years to come.

This is the background to the still unresolved euro crisis, which is primarily a balance-of-payments and banking crisis that only became a sovereign debt crisis as a consequence. Adding insult to injury, the crisis has left Germany in the driver’s seat in eurozone policymaking. Germany punches above its weight in current policy debates. Unfortunately, in misdiagnosing the true nature of the crisis, Germany’s policy prescriptions have focused on nothing but fiscal austerity and structural reform. The consequences are proving a disaster for Europe. In particular, since Germany refuses to adjust its massive external imbalance and continues to have very low inflation, the ongoing rebalancing process inside the currency union is proving deflationary for everyone else. Essentially, as average eurozone wage and price inflation has fallen to extremely low levels, euro crisis countries are forced into debt deflation. Predictably, the wreckage is truly enormous. Policies and consequences are akin to what U.S. President Hoover and German Chancellor Brüning attempted in the 1930s. As we know, this sad experiment in macro policy folly gave the U.S. FDR, the New Deal, and Social Security, while outcomes in Germany were far less benign. It is as yet unclear which path Europe will take this time; the constructive or the destructive one.

What drives then Germany’s current policy? Doesn’t its leadership recognize the danger it poses for the future of the eurozone?

Confusion, a load full of ideological baggage, and short-sighted vested interests, I suppose. Apparently the German authorities do not understand the futility of their favored policies. My reading is that they have never quite understood that Germany could only succeed with its peculiar economic model in the past because and as long as its key trading partners behaved differently. Today Germany is forcing Europe to become like Germany. The trouble is of course that not everyone can be super-competitive and run perpetual current account surpluses at the same time. Somehow the German authorities are stuck in a deep ideological hole on this issue – and they keep on digging.

If Germany continues practicing its current policies, what would be the most likely outcome? Will we head towards the dissolution of the eurozone or with the permanent two- or even three-tier Europe and with the periphery in a quasi colonial situation?

Without a fundamental U-turn in Germany policy I expect the euro experiment, which has clearly failed at this point, to end in full-blown disaster: dissolution. Germany can only run perpetual current account surpluses vis-à-vis its euro partners with fiscal transfers as their counterpart. But such a “transfer union” is precisely what Germany dreads most. Somehow the German authorities, supposedly under pressure from Germany’s powerful export lobby, have trouble seeing the inevitable link between the two. Or perhaps they have convinced themselves that, as Germany’s euro partners become just like Germany, the eurozone as a whole can from now on run up a large external imbalance. If this is the new master plan, they are kidding themselves. The U.S. Treasury has just fired a broadside at Germany for this foolish endeavor, making it very clear that repeating at the global level the very strategy which has wrecked Europe was unacceptable [plačiau apie tai - čia]. Let me add that the Germany finance ministry’s response that Germany’s seven-percent-of-GDP current account surplus was neither a problem to Europe nor the world is truly scary, once again highlighting that the German authorities are bathing themselves in delusion and denial.

Išeitis iš politinio akligatvio, autoriaus nuomone, būtų bendro iždo, aprūpinamo finansiniais resursais per obligacijų emisijas, įgalioto vykdyti stambias investicijas visoje eurozonoje, sukūrimas.

I do believe however that my Euro Treasury plan features a minimalistic but functional fiscal union that would finally put the euro on a viable track.

By the way, Germany’s role in all this is not to embark on a national fiscal expansion. Germany’s own fiscal space is actually too limited for that and, while the markets may chose to ignore this fact at their peril, Germany is actually in an extremely vulnerable position itself. What we need from Germany is to emerge from its current state of delusion and denial, and to allow and facilitate the regime reforms needed to put the euro on a viable track. Without the Euro Treasury, the “strengthened” so-called Stability and Growth Pact and the “Fiscal Compact” are nothing but the euro’s deathtrap. By contrast, the Euro Treasury to-be turns the flawed project into a viable one. Needless to say, this would be in Germany’s own national interest, while, ultimately, its current policies are not. Germany has much to gain from a viable euro regime – just as breakup of the euro would prove extremely costly to Germany.

Techniškai įmanomas planas, politiškai dar ne.

Papildymas. Žiū, visai linksma "vokiečių atsakomybės" polemika. Brussels Blog:
2013.11.11 Rehn siding with Washington in its battle with Berlin?

Over the last few weeks, the normally über-dismal science of German economic policymaking has unexpectedly become stuff of international diplomatic brinkmanship, after the US Treasury department accused Berlin of hindering eurozone and global growth by suppressing domestic demand at a time its economy is growing on the backs of foreigners buying German products overseas.

The accusation not only produced the expected counterattack in Berlin, but has become the major debating point among the economic commentariat. Our own Martin Wolf, among others, has taken the side of Washington and our friend and rival Simon Nixon over at the Wall Street Journal today has backed the Germans.

Now comes the one voice that actually can do something about it: Olli Rehn, the European Commission’s economic tsar who just made his views known in a blog post on his website. Why should Rehn’s views take precedence? Thanks to new powers given to Brussels in the wake of the eurozone crisis, he can force countries to revise their economic policies – including an oversized current account surplus – through something soporifically known as the Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure.

2013.11.13 Rehn, Germany and US Treasury Dept: Round Two (Ko tie amerikonai kabinėjasi?)

OpenEurope, 2013.11.13 Reviewing Germany's surplus

Signs on this front so far show the potential for conflict. German reactions have already been quite hostile with CSU General Secretary Alexander Dobrindt warning that, “You don't strengthen Europe by weakening Germany” and CDU General Secretary Hermann Gröhe adding, “Our export strength is the corner stone of our prosperity”. Bundesbank President Jens Weidmann added that expanding Germany fiscal policy is also not the answer, saying, “The positive knock-on effects would be limited”.

Mark Blyth apie "atsakingąjį taupumą" ir bankų problemas

"Atsakingo taupymo politika" skurdina ekonomikas, o skurdas kerta per realiąją visų privačių finansinių aktyvų vertę. Nuvertėjantys aktyvai kiurdo bankų balansus.

Nemoki finansų sistema svirduliuoja ant bankų panikos ribos. ECB likvidumo operacijos gelbsti, bet problemos nesprendžia.

Tradicinio bankų krizių sprendimo metodo - totalinės fiskalinio suvereno garantijos - eurozona taikyti negali, nes fiskalinio suvereno tiesiog nėra. Niekas neįgaliotas "spausdinti pinigų" tiek, kiek reikia. Faktiškai, toli viršydamas savo įgaliojimus, remdamasis instituciniu autoritetu, tai galėtų daryti nebent ECB, bet "pliusinių" valstybių rinkėjai sužinoję nustebtų.

Galima garantijų sistemą kurti slapta, "už balansų", bet neįgaliotų asmenų slaptų garantijų patikimumas abejotinas.

Eurozona turi struktūrinę problemą.
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Pasakyti dalykai yra tik kuklus komentaras Mark Blyth valandos paskaitai Google. Lektorius charizmatiškas, šneka tiesi. HT +Arijit Banik.



YouTube esama trumpesnių Mark Blyth įrašų.

Nausėdai: euras - kaip trijų metrų gylio duobė

SEB banko prezidento patarėjas Gitanas Nausėda „Žinių radijo“ laidoje „Atviras pokalbis“ teigė, kad šalies politikų neapsisprendimas dėl euro įvedimo gali brangiai kainuoti.

„Mes įsivaizduojame, kad euro įvedimas yra, jeigu kalbant krepšinio terminais, kažkoks trijų metrų skersmens krepšinio lankas, į kurį kamuolį gali įmesti bet kada. Šiandien nenoriu, įmesiu rytoj... Bet juk taip nėra. Mes šiuo metu turime tikrai labai neblogas sąlygas patekti į euro zoną tiek dėl infliacijos, tiek dėl valstybės skolos, tiek dėl net biudžeto deficito, o rytoj nėra jokių garantijų, kad pasaulyje infliacija neišaugs, Europoje infliacija neišaugs, Lietuvoje infliacija neišaugs... Ji gali išaugti ir mums gali būti labai sunku į tą korsetą įsisprausti 2015 ar 2016 m.“, – perspėjo G.Nausėda.

Perfrazuodamas Gitaną Nausėdą vairavimo terminais, verčiau siūlau eurą įsivaizduoti kaip trijų metrų gylio duobę, kurią kelyje reikia atsargiai apvažiuoti. Nebent trokštume ateities, kurioje vietoje demokratijos būtume "krizės svertais" vairuojami puse lūpų kalbančių ECB statytinių.

Kalbėdamas apie eurozonos bėdas, britų laikraščio Daily Telegraph apžvalgininkas Ambrose Evans-Pritchard paminėjo šiemet italų kalba išleistą knygą "Morire di Austerita". Knygos autorius Lorenzo Bini-Smaghi iki 2011-ųjų lapkričio buvo aukščiausio lygio ECB funkcionieriumi - priklausė ECB vykdomosios tarybos šešetui.

Citata nuo knygos viršelio: "La crisi è soprattutto politica. Riflette l’incapacità delle democrazie occidentali di risolvere problemi accumulati da oltre un ventennio. Chi è eletto democraticamente fa fatica a prendere decisioni impopolari che possono comprometterne la rielezione. L’emergenza diventa così il motore dell’azione politica e il modo per giustificare le manovre correttive di fronte agli elettori, con la conseguenza che la cura - tardiva e varata sotto la pressione dei mercati - diventa ancor più dolorosa e impopolare."

Vertimas (ačiū už pagalbą +Agne Ma): Krizė yra visų pirma politinė. Ji demonstruoja vakarietiškų demokratijų nesugebėjimą spręsti daugiau nei dvidešimt metų besikaupiančias problemas. Demokratiškai išrinktos vyriausybės nesugeba daryti nepopuliarių sprendimų, kurie galėtų neigiamai įtakoti perrinkimą. Todėl krizė tampa politiniu stimulu ir būdu pasiteisinti prieš rinkėjus dėl korekcinių manevrų, duodančių reikiamą rezultatą. Bet pavėluotai, rinkų spaudimo fone vykdomos priemonės būna dar skausmingesnės ir nepopuliarios.

Knyga pateikia problemų, kurių tos "neefektyvios" demokratijos nesugeba "išspręsti", paaiškinimą: Target2 (centrinių bankų tarpusavio garantijų sistemos) disbalansai. Kitaip - pati eurosistemos esmė. Pasirodo, buvusio ECB vykdomosios tarybos nario nuomone, tai "demokratijos problema" ir ją leidžiama spręsti, "spaudžiant krizės svertus".

Kapitalas (bankų įsipareigojimai eurais) eurozonoje, žinote, turi "mobilumo teisę". O patys bankai gali įsipareigoti, kaip tik jiems šauna į galvą. Pavyzdžiui banką valdantys asmenys per statytinius gali įsipareigoti patys sau. Jei nori, gali tą įsipareigojimą perkelti į bet kurį kitą eurozonos banką (pervesti pinigus). Pervedimui įvykus, valstybės balansas Target2 sistemoje pablogėja visa to pervedimo suma. O valstybės, į kurią pinigai "nuėjo", "pagerėja".

(Jeigu toks bankas nusprogtų, ir paaiškėtų, kad pusė jo aktyvų fiktyvūs, anuliuoti tokios operacijos, nepasibylinėjus kelių valstybių teismuose, nebūtų įmanoma.)

Centrinio banko funkcionieriaus politikos supratimas toks: įsiskolinimai, atsirandantys per Target2 tvarkant neaišku kokius reikalus bankams su neaišku kokiais balansais [dar vienas "balansų skylės" paaiškinimas čia], turi būti "aptarnaujami" realaus ekonominio produkto, realios vertės srautais. Politikai privalo tai iš savo ekonomikų išspausti.

Ir apie tai neturi būti viešai kalbama kitaip, kaip apie fiskalinę drausmę. Rekomenduojama reklamuoti būsimą "bankų sąjungą", būsimą bankų priežiūros mechanizmą, būsimą garantinį fondą į kurį per dešimt metų gal bus surinkta 50 milijardų eurų.

Kam nepatinka - pats kaltas. Knygoje atskleidžiami ECB Italijoje inicijuoto politinio perversmo, įvykdyto Berlusconi 2011-aisiais pradėjus konsultacijas dėl Italijos išstojimo iš eurozonos, faktai.

Visų eurozonos šalių Target2 įsipareigojimai Vokietijai - virš pusės trilijono eurų, bankų sistemos balansų skylė - dar ne mažiau trilijono. Knygoje aprašomas epizodas, kaip 2012-aisiais Vokietijos kanclerė Merkel jau buvo susiruošusi išmesti Graikiją iš eurozonos, bet išgirdus paaiškinimą, kokios bus grandininės bankrotų reakcijos, ir kas galiausiai turės mokėti, persigalvojo. Rizika ir įtampos susidarė tokios, kad Target2 prižiūrėtojai Vokietijoje "naktimis nebemiega".

Kadangi tie įsipareigojimai kolektyviniai [dar vienas paaiškinimas čia], Vokietijai palanku, kai juos prisiima daugiau šalių. Kaip ne keista, tai palanku ir naujai prisijungiančiųjų narių elitams.

Propagandos mašinos įjungtos. Bankininkai juodais kostiumais Lietuvoje:
V. Vasiliauskas: neturime teisės dar kartą paleisti vėjais galimybės įsivesti eurą;
G. Nausėda: euro [neįvedimo] klausimas Lietuvai gali brangiai kainuoti;

bet... Vasiliauskas: krizė atskleidė finansų sistemos spragas

Gal manote, kad ponas Vasiliauskas kalba apie sistemines spragas? Besąlygines garantijas, tik po dešimties metų sugalvojant, kad tų garantijų galutiniai naudotojai - bankai - turėtų būti išties, o ne formaliai kontroliuojami?

Žinoma, ne. Spręskite patys:

Pono Vasiliausko teigimu, Europai būtinas toks finansų priežiūros ir reguliavimo priemonių rinkinys, kuris ne tik sustiprintų finansų sistemą, bet ir paskatintų ekonomikos, ypač smulkiojo ir vidutinio verslo, finansavimą.

„Vienas didžiausių ES iššūkių – užtrukęs finansų sistemos susiskaidymas, neigiamai veikiantis ūkio raidą. Tik pašalinę jo priežastis, galėsime atkurti normalų finansų rinkos funkcionavimą ir taip paskatinti ekonomikos atsigavimą. Mūsų įsitikinimu, tai vienas iš svarbiausių Lietuvos pirmininkavimo tikslų, todėl šiandien ir rytoj vykstančiame susitikime išskirtinį dėmesį skirsime bankų sąjungos bei mažųjų ir vidutinių įmonių finansavimo klausimams“, – pranešime cituojamas Lietuvos banko valdybos pirmininkas.

Ambrose Evans-Pritchard žodžiais:

He [Lorenzo Bini-Smaghi - ed.] confirms that Germany is indeed on the hook for €574bn of credits from the Bundesbank to the central banks of Greece, Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Cyprus, and Slovenia.

We have always been assured that the so-called Target2 credits within the ECB's internal payments system is a technical adjustment, without significant risk.

Mr Bini-Smaghi states that any EMU state leaving the euro would face likely default on external obligations. "The national central bank would not be able to repay liabilities accumulated in relation to other members of the euro system, which are registered in the internal payments system of the Union (known as Target2). The insolvency would provoke substantial losses for counter-parties in other eurozone countries, including central banks and states." [...]

This means that if the euro blows up, the Bundesbank still owes this money to the same private banks, which could be Deutsche Bank, but could also be Nomura, Citigroup, or Barclays. This is not fictitious. The Bundesbank cannot default on these securities.

Perhaps I am a bear of very little brain, but I have yet to hear a satisfactory explanation as to how this can be conjured away painlessly, as we are told by a long list of illustrious economists that it can be. I have never seen them answer this issue. They publish long papers, blinding everybody with science as economists are prone to do (usually bluffing), but never get to the core point.

The fact is that Target2 is the flipside of intra-EMU capital flight. Private investors have pulled out of Club Med, dumping their claims onto the taxpayers of Germany and the northern creditor states. Dress this up any way you want, but that is the reality.

Yes, the Bundesbank could print money with gay abandon in such a crisis – and would have to do so to avoid a deflationary shock, and on a much larger scale than anything suggested so far within the EMU construct. Germany would no doubt muddle through, but its monetary doctrines would be shredded.

The Bundesbank's official position is that the Target2 controversy is a storm in a teacup. In fact, they don't believe it themselves. A Bundesbanker with direct responsibility for Target2 said in my presence that he "worries about it every night". The bank's own president Jens Weidmann testified last year that the imbalances are an "unacceptable risk".

I suspect that somebody is trying to pull the wool over the eyes of the German people, and it is not the splendidly outspoken Jens Weidmann.

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Brad DeLong:
No mystery, guys; you messed up.

Vokiškas bėdavojimas: norėtųsi daugiau demokratijos - niekas nepaduoda

Jürgen Habermas SPIEGEL'yje sako, kad Eurozona ir Vokietija indoktrinuotos iliuzijomis, kurių palaikymas nelabai dera su demokratija. Esą derėtų diskutuoti nepopuliarius dalykus rinkimų kampanijos metu, o ne tada, kai jau šaukštai bus po pietų.

Merkel's European Failure: Germany Dozes on a Volcano

In the name of market imperatives to which there is allegedly no alternative, an increasingly isolated German government is enforcing harsh austerity policies in France and those euro-zone countries gripped by crisis. Contrary to reality, it assumes that all members of the European monetary union can make their own decisions regarding budgetary and economic policy. They are expected to "modernize" their administration and economy, and to enhance their competitiveness on their own -- if necessary with aid loans from the rescue fund.

This fiction of sovereignty is convenient for Germany, because it saves the stronger partner from having to take into account the negative effects that some policies can have on weaker partners. It is a situation that European Central Bank President Mario Draghi warned about a year ago, saying that "it is neither sustainable nor legitimate for countries to pursue national policies that can cause economic harm for others" (Die Zeit, Aug. 30, 2012).

It's worth repeating again and again: The suboptimal conditions under which the European Monetary Union operates today are the result of a design flaw, namely that the political union was never completed. That's why pushing the problems onto the shoulders of the crisis-ridden countries with credit financing isn't the answer. The imposition of austerity policies cannot correct the existing economic imbalances in the euro zone. An assimilation of the different levels in productivity in the mid-term could only be expected from a joint, or at least closely coordinated, fiscal, economic and social policy. And if we then, in the course of countervailing policies, don't wish to completely turn into a technocracy, we must ask the public what they think about a democratic core Europe. Wolfgang Schäuble knows this. He says as much in SPIEGEL interviews, which, however, have no consequences for his political behavior.

European policy is in a trap that the political sociologist Claus Offe has sharply illuminated: If we do not want to give up the monetary union, an institutional reform, which takes time, is both necessary and unpopular. This is why politicians who hope to be re-elected are kicking the can down the road [...]

On the other hand, what exactly does "unpopular" mean? If a political solution is sensible, it should be reasonable to ask a democratic electorate to accept it. And when should one do so, if not before a parliamentary election? Anything else is patronizing deception. It is always a mistake to underestimate and ask too little of voters. I consider it a historical failure of the political elites in Germany if they continue to shut their eyes and behave as if it were business as usual -- that is, if they persist in their shortsighted wrangling over the fine print behind closed doors, which is the current approach.

Instead, politicians should come clean with the increasingly restless citizenry, which has never been confronted with substantial European issues. They should take the lead in an inevitably polarizing dispute over alternatives, none of which is available for free. And they should no longer remain silent about the negative redistribution effects, which the "donor countries," in their own long-term interest, must accept in the short and medium term as the only constructive solution to the crisis.

Tekste trūksta problemų masto, atstovaujamų interesų įvardinimo. Tarsi būtų kalbama apie nedidelius reglamento pažeidimus, rutinines politios problemėles.

Kokia žurnalistika, tokia ir politika.
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[Papildau] Germans Believe Politicians Are Lying About Crisis, Says Study (blogs.wsj), The Missing Truth in the German Campaign (editors.bloomberg)

Open Europe apie bankų sąjungą

Pro-europinis britų Open Europe institutas (think tank) dar 2013.07.10 skelbė verdiktą kuriamai bankų sąjungai:

The banking union is likely to form an important part of any solution to the eurozone crisis (if one can be found) and the SRM is a vital pillar of this. However, the Commission’s proposal as it stands is likely too small, will not be implemented soon enough and suffers from significant political opposition. It does not therefore have a realistic chance of ending the financial fragmentation plaguing the eurozone. Furthermore, it also stretches the limits of the EU treaties, setting a worrying precedent for the UK and other non-eurozone countries as it poses the risk that single market treaty articles can be used for purely eurozone ends. Even Germany has insisted that such a far-reaching proposal which effectively alters the eurozone architecture requires treaty change, be it now or in the future. The eurozone is yet to face up to the fundamental problem of reconciling the economic realities within the existing legal and political limits – this proposal is another example of attempting to circumvent them in another ad-hoc way. As long as this approach continues uncertainty will plague the eurozone.

New Open Europe flash analysis: Controversial second pillar of banking union looks insufficient to hold up eurozone roof in a crisis

Korektišku tonu ir labai dalykiškai paaiškinta, kad kuriama bankų sąjunga yra tik pirmas netvirtas žingsnis link didelės problemos sprendimo. Dar net neaišku, ar tą mažą, toli gražu problemų nesprendžiantį mechanizmą pavyks sukurti apskritai.

Apie garantinio fondo dydį:

A Single Bank Resolution Fund (SBRF) will be set up and will equal 1% of insured deposits in the banking union, around €55bn. This will be built up by bank contributions over the course of 10 years. How much and how each bank will contribute is yet to be defined and may be set out in Commission delegated acts. This is a worrying precedent since it provides a significant amount of power to set the scope and nature of a financial levy to the Commission without significant oversight.

As of May 2013, bank assets in the EU totalled €45 trillion, while in the eurozone they totalled €32.5 trillion – this is equal to 349% and 342% of GDP respectively.

Clearly, given the size of the banking sector this backstop seems short of being the necessary size. We have previously estimated that a fund would need to be around €500bn to €600bn to provide a viable backstop for a banking sector this size (in line with international comparisons and standards). Importantly, most resolution funds are backed by a credit line or implicit guarantee from a treasury or national central bank. Absent this, serious questions remain over the viability of the fund and the SRB to act swiftly during a crisis.

Under the EC plans “no explicit” role is given to the ESM, the eurozone bailout fund, which now has the ability to directly recapitalise banks using up to €60bn. This provides a further buffer, but given the significant hurdles to its use and the strict conditions, it seems unlikely to be tapped in anything but the worst crisis (as we have already noted).

Bail-in plans bear most of the burden under the banking union: A significant amount of emphasis is being put on the bail-in plans to bear the brunt of a resolution process. It is clear that a lower taxpayer burden is desirable. That said, the knock-on effects could be painful for the eurozone in terms of higher bank funding costs. Furthermore, the potential for contagion in a crisis is clear.

Meanwhile, given the size of these funds relative to national banks, it is unlikely to be sufficient to break the sovereign banking loop, not least because bail-ins on domestically focused banks will have a significant impact on the national economy (still the purview of national governments).

Kiti klausimai (analizės turinys):

1. Where does the power lie?
2. Will the resolution fund be large enough to backstop the €33 trillion eurozone banking sector?
3. Will the SRM be able to put the banking sector on “sounder footing, restore confidence and overcome fragmentation in financial markets”?
4. Will it require treaty change?
5. Germany has come out swinging
6. How could this impact the UK and non-eurozone countries?

Must-read.

Beveik euro optimistas Mark Blyth

Optimistai galvoja, kad jeigu žiaurosistema taptų netvari, elektoriatas ką nors nubalsuotų geriau. Miela iliuzija

Is it the notion of the “new normal” which retains the politicians and mainstream economist to realize that austerity has failed?

If the “new normal” is a permanent unemployment rate of 20 percent and the constant destruction of productive capacity, then the new normal will not be normal very long. At the end of the day you can’t run a gold standard type if monetary regime, which is what the Euro is in that no one can create the currency that they use and so deprived of inflation and devaluation as options the adjustment to shocks occurs entirely through wages and prices, in a democracy. Eventually someone will vote against it, and at that point the entire project can unravel. 

Nereikėtų turėti iliuzijų dėl tų demokratijų. Bet respect' Mark'ui už idealizmą.

Ambrose Evans-Pritchard apie Latviją

Lietuvos BVP atrodo kiek geriau, ir mes neturime tokių įtampų su tautinėm mažumom. Visa kita galime taikyti sau.

Ambrose Evans-Pritchard: Mad Latvia defies its own people to join the euro

EU finance ministers have just given the go-ahead for Latvia to join the euro in January 2014.
No matter that the latest SKDS poll shows that only 22pc of Latvians support this foolish step, and 53pc are opposed.
This is a very odd situation. The elites are pushing ahead with a decision of profound implications, knowing that the nation is not behind them. No country has ever done this before. 

Lietuva.

The concerns of the Latvian people are entirely understandable. Neighbouring Estonia found itself having to bail out Club Med states with a per capita income two and a half times as high after it joined EMU. Latvia may find itself embroiled in an even bigger debacle if the contractionary fiscal and monetary policies of the eurozone push Slovenia, Portugal, Spain, and Italy over a cliff, and push Greece and Cyprus into yet deeper crisis.

Apsimetame, kad krizė nesisteminė, nuostolių galimybę neigiame. Priešingu atveju tektų pripažinti savas klaidas.

It is worth reading the European Commission's report earlier this year on poverty and social exclusion.
Latvia stands out – with Bulgaria – as the country that has seen worst increase in "severe material deprivation", with the rate surging from 19pc to 31pc since 2008. (Bulgaria also has a fixed exchange rate, by the way). 

(Tekste grafikas visoms EU-27 valstybėms. Lietuvos skurdo rodikliai penkti nuo galo.)

While Latvia's unemployment rate has dropped to 11.7pc from a peak of 20.5pc, this is not the full story. Another 7pc have dropped off the rolls (one of the highest rates of discouraged workers in the EU). Roughly 10pc of the population has left the country.
The blue collar working classes have borne the brunt of the deflation strategy, while the affluent middle class with foreign currency mortgages have been protected. Policy has been shaped for the class interest of the elites (sorry to sound like a Marxist, but Marx was good at spotting this kind of abuse). Many who lost their jobs in the crisis – often Russian ethnics – have not found work, and may never do so again in Latvia if they are over 50.
This is how internal devaluations work. They break the back of labour resistance to pay cuts by driving the jobless rate to excruciating levels. The policy is a moral disgrace. Mussolini pulled it off in 1927 with his Blackshirts to secure the Lira Forte, but is that supposed to be a pedigree?

Analogiška situacija. Ironiška, bet pas mus fašizmu vadinamas tautiškumas. Dešimtadalio gyventojų emigracija daro įspūdį nebent kokiems nevykėliams. Išvažiavo ir išvažiavo, ar jau nėra apie ką daugiau kalbėti?

The country's recovery does not vindicate EMU austerity doctrine in any way at all. It merely shows that states with low debt and high exports can survive such a policy.
A low bar, surely?
As for joining the euro, you must be mad.

Kipro zona

Verslo žinioms raportuojant, Šadžiui sapaliojant apie žiaurozonos bankų sąjungą (kurią buvo sutarta įsivesti 2013 pradžioje, bet Vokietija atšoko ir iki šiol atšokusi), Kipre euras nutrupėjo. Kapitalo kontrolė, kurios įvedimo metu kovą buvo šnekama apie "savaitės" laikinumą, taip ir nepanaikinta.

Kipras tapo eurozonos bankų problemų sprendimo etalonu. Bankas uždaromas, jo filialuose užsienyje atsiskaitoma su prioritetiniais klientais, visiems kitiems - garantuotų sumų grąžinimas, bet su kapitalo kontrole, likusių - kapitalizavimas.

Yra cinikų, manančių, kad taip "patvarkius" kokį Ispanijos banką, Eurozona lehman'izuosis į bankų panikos apimtų teritorijų su kapitalo kontrolėmis sąjungą. Viliojanti perspektyva.

Andrew Higgins, NYT - Currency Controls in Cyprus Increase Worry About Euro System

With a gross domestic product of about $23 billion and shrinking, Cyprus is little more than a rounding error in the $9.5 trillion euro zone economy. But Cyprus is also the first nation using the euro to restrict the flow of capital, raising a crucial question: Has the breakup of the euro zone — something European leaders have been struggling to prevent for three years with frantic summit meetings in Brussels and a series of bailout packages worth hundreds of billions of euros — in fact already started?

President Nicos Anastasiades of Cyprus certainly thinks so. “Actually, we are already out of the euro zone,” he said, citing restrictions on the movement of euros from Cyprus as evidence that his country’s money now has a different status and value from that in France, Germany and the 14 other European Union nations that use the currency. [...]

The rules of the European Union, enshrined in the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, ban restrictions on the movement of capital, but the measures by Cyprus have been endorsed by the European Central Bank and the union’s executive arm, the European Commission, as essential to prevent money from fleeing the country. While the European Central Bank declined to comment on the Cyprus situation, officials in Brussels say they remain firmly committed to maintaining the euro as a single currency.

Nevertheless, many financial experts say Cyprus has, in effect, made a “silent, hidden exit” from the euro, said Guntram B. Wolff, the director of Bruegel, a Brussels research group. Despite a softening of restrictions, he added, “the euro in Cyprus is still not the same as a euro in Frankfurt.

Maastricht'o sutartis, ištikus Kipro krizei, ignoruojama. Kokia tikimybė, kad per eilinį paaštrėjimą bus laikomasi (jeigu bus pasirašytos) bankų sąjungos sutarčių?

Propagandos pergalės. Degradavimas gerėja.

2013 m. birželio 3 d Europos centrinio banko vadovas: atsigavimas – jau čia pat

Europos centriniam bankui (ECB) sušvelninus savo monetarinę politiką ir išaugus paklausai eksporto rinkose, euro zonos ekonomika antrąjį šių metų pusmetį ims atsigauti, apie tai pirmadienį kalbėdamas tarptautinėje finansų konferencijoje Šanchajuje sakė ECB vadovas Mario Draghi.

"Ekonominė situacija euro zonoje tebėra sudėtinga, bet atsirado galimos stabilizacijos požymių, ir nuo antrojo šių metų pusmečio prognozuojamas laipsniškas atsigavimas", - sakė jis.

ECB vadovas taip pat paragino problemines ES šalis dėti daugiau pastangų sumažinti savo šalies biudžeto deficitą.

[...] "Šalys gali vykdyti reformas be OMT ir išsaugoti savo ekonominį suverenumą, arba jos gali pertvarkyti savo ekonomiką su OMT pagalba ir atsisakyti dalies savo ekonominio suverenumo, - M. Draghi žodžius, pasakytus tarptautinėje finansų konferencijoje Šanchajuje, cituoja "Associated Press".

Austerity Blitz: Eurozone Notes From Beyond the Grave
Tuesday, 02 July 2013, by CJ Polychroniou, Truthout

The capacity of the political elite to manipulate public opinion should never be underestimated. A glaring example is the case of Greece, where the government's propaganda in portraying an economic catastrophe and the conversion of a sovereign nation into a banana republic as a "success story" seems to be paying off dividends, as the latest polls show the gap between the conservative party and the Coalition of the Radical Left, or Syriza, widening. French President Francois Hollande, who managed to become the most unpopular French president after only a few months in power, seemed to be following the same route when he declared on a recent trip to Japan that the euro zone crisis is over

[...] leading actors in the EU /.../ opted from the start to seek to exorcise the demons of financial instability and turmoil not through the use of expansionary fiscal policy tools, but by reliance on tough austerity measures and mindless fiscal consolidation. They do this without any consideration at all for the damage these policies inflict on human lives and the social fabric of societies in general. As one major study pointedly reveals, austerity indeed kills.(1)

[...] Lacking a federal structure and a democratic form of governance, the Euroland has evolved into a peculiar type of an empire whereby the core seeks to maintain its privileged position by pursuing policies detrimental to the periphery. Hence the great imbalances in the euro zone and the widening divide between North and South; hence also the conversion of the euro into a currency with a double function: providing a competitive advantage for the advanced nations of the North and serving as an albatross around the neck of the less developed nations of the South.

In the course of the crisis, the core has also attempted to convert the peripherals into colonies as a means of controlling the spread of the crisis throughout the euro zone.

[...] policies pursued by Brussels and Berlin are depriving the indebted euro zone member states of their sovereign status and are making a mockery of democratic processes and institutions.

As things stand, the euro zone is doomed to collapse. It lacks a banking or fiscal union and its hegemon is playing the role of a debt collector - all while national economies are collapsing and human lives are being destroyed.

Čekijos centrinis bankas atmetė ECB senjoražo "pasiūlymus"

Centriniai bankai neprivalo turėti jų įsipareigojimus viršijančio turto - savo koordinacines funkcijas gali puikiai atlikti turėdami bet kokio dydžio neigiamą kapitalą. O jeigu galima dirbti be užsienio atsargų, kyla pagrįstas klausimas, kokio velnio centriniam bankui jas kaupti.

Pavyzdžiui Lietuvos bankas deklaruoja šiuo metu turįs ~19 mlrd.lt vertės tarptautinių atsargų. Kas nors suvokia, kam jos reikalingos? Valiutos stabilumui palaikyti? Ar tikrai verta vardan itin stabilaus lito kurso ne itin stabilaus euro atžvilgiu laikyti įšaldžius tokias atsargas? Kai 2009-ųjų pradžioje, paties didžiausio krizės nuosmukio metu, Lietuvai vadovaujantys tešlagalviai priėmė "herojišką" sprendimą "išlaikyti valiutos stabilumą", ar LB atsargos buvo kam nors panaudotos?

Ne. "Stabilumą išlaikė" sužlugdydami ekonomiką ir praskolindami valstybę. Centrinio banko atsargų piršteliu paliest nedrįso.

Sveiko proto testas: a) užsienio skola auga, b) centrinis bankas prisisūdęs užsienio aktyvų. Ką daryti?

Mokomės iš Čekijos (Dirk Ehnts):

There was a dispute some time ago between the ECB and the Czech Central Bank, which is described by Karl Wheelan in paper from November 2012:

The final argument, which Buiter and Rahbari advocate as a more convincing one, is perhaps best illustrated via an ongoing dispute between the ECB and the Czech National Bank. The Eurosystem has no legal requirement that its participating central banks have positive capital. Nonetheless, in its 2010 and 2012 Convergence Reports, the ECB has admonished the Czech National Bank because it has a negative capital position. Specifically, ECB (2010) recommends that the negative capital situation should be rectified “in order to comply with the principle of financial independence.”
According to this argument, negative capital compromises a central bank’s independence because it requires them at some point to request funds from the government to restore their positive capital position. Governments could then look for more influence over monetary policy in return for honouring this request. However, this is a completely circular argument. It relies on the assumption that positive central bank capital is required, so central banks must request recapitalisation and have their independence compromised. If positive capital is not required, then no request for recapitalisation is required and independence is not compromised.
Consistent with this point, the Czech National Bank has issued a statement (CNB, 2010) to say that it considers the ECB’s statement “completely unacceptable”. Specifically, it notes that “Throughout its existence, its capital position has never undermined its independence or limited its decision-making and operational capacity in any way. The CNB is therefore convinced that there can be no doubt about its legal and factual independence. Negative capital presents no problem for the CNB, and the central bank is able to meet its obligations.”

Lietuvis, prisiklausęs pasakų apie lito padengimą užsienio aktyvais ir savarankiškos centrinio banko politikos negalimumą turėtų krist iš kėdės iš pavydo. Čekams galima, o mums ne? Kodėl?

(Todėl, kad pinigų politikos prioritetą teikiant ne nacionaliniams, o neaišku kieno interesams, nebegalima nieko - negalima CB aktyvų investuoti neaptarnaujant svetimo senjoražo, negalima valstybinio sektoriaus lėšų nelaikyti užsienio savininkų bankuose, negalima turėti valstybinio komercinio banko).

Neseniai į akį krito 'interfluidity' Steve Randy Waldman replika neigiamo CB kapitalo adresu. Monetary policy for the 21st century:

There is a theory that the value of a currency is somehow related to the strength of the issuing central bank’s balance sheet, so a currency issued against fictional “goodwill” would quickly become worthless. Suffice it to say that, with respect to non-redeemable fiat currencies, there is absolutely no evidence for this theory. There is no evidence, for example, that the purchasing power of the US dollar has any relationship whatsoever to the Fed’s holdings of gold or foreign exchange reserves. The assets of existing central banks are mostly loans denominated in the currency the bank itself can produce at will. You may argue that those assets are nevertheless “real”, because repayments to the central bank will be with money earned from real activity. But that assumes what we are trying to explain, that people are willing surrender real goods and services in exchange for the bank’s scrip. Perhaps fiat currency derives its value from coercive taxation by government, as the MMT-ers maintain. Perhaps the imprimatur of the state serves as an arbitrary focal point for the coordination equilibrium required for a common medium of exchange. I don’t know what makes fiat currency valuable, but I do know that the real asset portfolio of the issuing central bank has very little to do with it.

Žinia, kai ekonominė teorija trukdo kreivai realybei, realybei nuo to nei šilta, nei šalta.

So, there is no problem with negative equity at the ECB, it seems. It’s just that the rules – once again – that had been put into place do not allow the ECB to function properly as a central bank. Without a major change in the rules regarding the ECB the crisis will never stop. The existing system is faulty and only “works” because Mario Draghi broke the rules. “Works” means here that the financial system does not collapse. However, the problems in the real economy are still there. The euro zone is in recession, some countries have mass unemployment and young people face the worst job market since the end of WW II.

Yra įvairių argumentų. Norint iš čekų ko išmokti, reikėtų galvoti. Galvojimas eikvoja energiją. Šuo kariamas pripranta.

Wynne Godley ir europietiškos problemos

Ralph Musgrave — European Commission tells the UK what do about youth unemployment.

That’s “European Commission” as in “we lot who have managed to create 50% youth unemployment in Greece, 50% in Spain and 36% in Portugal, so we obviously know what we’re talking about”.

See: Council Recommendation on the United Kingdom’s 2013 national reform programme

The European Commission’s – er – “advice” then descends from the ridiculous to the totally ridiculous: it tries to tell the UK what do about it’s deficit. Here it follows the standard IMF / OECD / Pete Peterson / Bowles and Simpson / Rogoff and Reinhart line, namely that a country should have a PLAN for deficit reduction.

The whole notion of a PLAN for reducing the debt or deficit is nonsense because it fails to get a point made by Keynes: “Look after unemployment and the budget will look after itself”.

In other words, a monetarily sovereign government should pitch it’s deficit (or surplus) at a level that reduces unemployment as far as is possible without exacerbating inflation too much. If the private sector happens to be in a fit of irrational exuberance, government may well need to run a surplus in order to confiscate financial assets from the private sector and quieten things down. Conversely, if the private sector is in subdued mood, government will need to run a deficit so as to boost demand and feed financial assets into private sector pockets.

And since it is impossible to predict what mood the private sector will be in in twelve months time (never mind three years time), it’s impossible to say what size deficit (or surplus) will be suitable in twelve months’ time or three year’s time.

Paskutinė pastraipa yra paprastas paaiškinimas, kodėl metinės BVP prognozės ir metiniai biudžetų planavimai negali būti "atsakingos" politikos dalimi. Prognozavimas tokiems laikotarpiams neveikia.

Jei kam įdomu, dedu nuorodą į 1998 metais publikuotą Wynne Godley ir George McCarthy straipsnį "Fiscal Policy Will Matter", kuriame jie

a) pademonstravo stock-flow consistent modelį, leidžiantį gana tiksliai prognozuoji JAV BVP pusę metų į priekį. Amerikos ekonomika didžiausia pasaulyje ir gana uždara, todėl tuos pusę metų galima laikyti ilgiausiu įmanomu prognozės laikotarpiu apskritai. Mažesnėms ir atviresnėms ekonomikoms prognozės būtų dar trumpesnės (jeigu dar būtų laiku prieinama joms reikalinga statistika;

b) suformulavo teiginį, dažnai vadinamą Godley teorema, pasak kurio bet kurios ekonomikos BVP augimui būtinas valdžios deficito plius eksporto santykio su mokesčiais ir importu augimas.

This concept of fiscal stance is not new. It is thirty years since Carl Christ, of Johns Hopkins University, had the brilliant insight that should an economy ever reach stationary equilibrium, all stock variables as well as all flow variables would be constant; and that if all stock variables, including government debt, were constant, government receipts would have to equal government payments. It would then follow that if the economy were moving toward stock-flow equilibrium and if taxes were levied as a proportion of income, the GDP of a (closed) economy would always be tracking, perhaps with a long lag, government outlays divided by the average tax rate – the very same concept that we call fiscal stance. Therefore, a necessary condition for the expansion of the economy, at least in the long term, is that the fiscal stance should rise: Government expenditure must rise relative to the average tax rate. If the tax rate were held constant, government expenditure would have to rise absolutely for output to grow; if government expenditure were held constant, the tax rate would have to fall.

Christ’s finding was confirmed in two famous articles, Blinder and Solow (1973) and Tobin and Buiter (1976). But this whole line of argument has never been influential in the policy discussion and now seems to have disappeared from the literature. Perhaps the notion of a stock-flow equilibrium is too much of a will-o’-the-wisp, and the lags that would lead the economy to it so long and complex that this concept of fiscal stance has been thought to have no operational significance. Our first major contention is that the Christ conclusion, suitably adapted, has a practical application of decisive importance.”

Jeigu jau pradėjom, pora papildančių nuorodų Michael Sankowski tekste:

The result of ignoring the accounting matrix is to forget we must have an ever increasing deficit in order to for the economy to grow. Reading through the papers by Buiter and Blinder, it’s easy to they knew this at some point roughly 40 years ago, but have forgotten it now.

(Update: Ramaman provides us the links to the papers Godley mentions. Blinder and Solow is here :Does Fiscal Policy Matter? (1972). Buiter and Tobin: Long Run Effects of Fiscal and Monetary Policy on Aggregate Demand (1974) )

Grįžkime prie eurozonos realijų. Žinomame 1992 metų straipsnyje Maastricht and All That Godley prognozavo dabartines eurozonos problemas

Some writers (such as Samuel Brittan and Sir Douglas Hague) have seriously suggested that EMU, by abolishing the balance of payments problem in its present form, would indeed abolish the problem, where it exists, of persistent failure to compete successfully in world markets. But as Professor Martin Feldstein pointed out in a major article in the Economist (13 June), this argument is very dangerously mistaken. If a country or region has no power to devalue, and if it is not the beneficiary of a system of fiscal equalisation, then there is nothing to stop it suffering a process of cumulative and terminal decline leading, in the end, to emigration as the only alternative to poverty or starvation.

ir nurodė gilumines priežastis

The central idea of the Maastricht Treaty is that the EC countries should move towards an economic and monetary union, with a single currency managed by an independent central bank. But how is the rest of economic policy to be run? As the treaty proposes no new institutions other than a European bank, its sponsors must suppose that nothing more is needed. But this could only be correct if modern economies were self-adjusting systems that didn’t need any management at all.

I am driven to the conclusion that such a view – that economies are self-righting organisms which never under any circumstances need management at all – did indeed determine the way in which the Maastricht Treaty was framed. It is a crude and extreme version of the view which for some time now has constituted Europe’s conventional wisdom (though not that of the US or Japan) that governments are unable, and therefore should not try, to achieve any of the traditional goals of economic policy, such as growth and full employment. All that can legitimately be done, according to this view, is to control the money supply and balance the budget. It took a group largely composed of bankers (the Delors Committee) to reach the conclusion that an independent central bank was the only supra-national institution necessary to run an integrated, supra-national Europe.

But there is much more to it all. It needs to be emphasised at the start that the establishment of a single currency in the EC would indeed bring to an end the sovereignty of its component nations and their power to take independent action on major issues. As Mr Tim Congdon has argued very cogently, the power to issue its own money, to make drafts on its own central bank, is the main thing which defines national independence. If a country gives up or loses this power, it acquires the status of a local authority or colony. Local authorities and regions obviously cannot devalue. But they also lose the power to finance deficits through money creation while other methods of raising finance are subject to central regulation. Nor can they change interest rates. As local authorities possess none of the instruments of macro-economic policy, their political choice is confined to relatively minor matters of emphasis – a bit more education here, a bit less infrastructure there. I think that when Jacques Delors lays new emphasis on the principle of ‘subsidiarity’, he is really only telling us we will be allowed to make decisions about a larger number of relatively unimportant matters than we might previously have supposed. Perhaps he will let us have curly cucumbers after all. Big deal!

Prieš dvidešimt metų pažadėjo, kad murkdysimės ir paaiškino kodėl. Deja, neapsiriko.

Merkel su Schäuble susirūpino įvaizdžiu

Spiegel Online. Austerity About-Face: German Government to Gamble on Stimulus

But a new way of thinking has recently taken hold in the German capital. In light of record new unemployment figures among young people, even the intransigent Germans now realize that action is needed. "If we don't act now, we risk losing an entire generation in Southern Europe," say people close to Schäuble.

Berlin is making an about-face, even though it aims to stick to its current austerity policy. The German government has stressed budget consolidation and structural reform since 2010, when Greece was on the verge of bankruptcy. Berlin has been arguing that this is the only way to instill confidence among investors in the battered debt-ridden countries and help their ailing economies recover.

[...] The government's change of heart isn't just a sign of selflessness and compassion. More than ever, the chancellor and the finance minister are worried that Berlin's tightfisted, heartless, austerity-obsessed image could solidify throughout Europe and do irreparable political damage. An exporting nation that sells two-thirds of its exports to other European countries cannot be unconcerned about its image abroad, they reason, especially when its government fears that constant criticism from the center-left Social Democratic Party (SPD) and the Green Party, claiming that it is acting as the gravedigger of the euro and dividing the EU, could hurt it in the upcoming election campaign.

[...] Last Tuesday, Schäuble sent a letter to Economics Minister Philipp Rösler in which he proposed that the coalition partners act together. "I believe that we should also offer bilateral German aid," he wrote, noting that he hoped that this approach would result in "significant faster-acting support with visible and psychologically effective results within a foreseeable time period."

Situaciją eurozonoje gelbėtų ekonomikos stimuliavimas fiskalinės ekspansijos priemonėmis. Politiškai tai nepriimtina, tai kad neatrodytų, jog visai nieko nedaroma, Vokietija paskolins pigiau pinigų nedideliems investiciniams projektams.

Depresuotoms pietų ekonomikosms toks stimuliavimas padės kaip viagra nabašninkui. Bet niekas negalės nuneigti, kad "Vokietija rūpinasi".

Pasitikėjimas

Pozityviai Europos projektą bevertina tik 33% graikų, 38% čekų, 41% prancūzų, 43% britų, 46% ispanų.

European Union: The Latest Casualty of the Euro Crisis