Kaip gelbėjo eurą

Financial Times artėjančių rinkimų į Europarlamentą proga publikavo jaudinančią esė kaip Europos nomenklatūra "gelbėjo" zoną nuo suirimo.

Gelbėjo susitarę, kad krizės metu visokie statutiniai ir demokratiniai apribojimai neturi būti kliūtimi didžiam tikslui, todėl galima atlikti vieną kitą perversmą. Vokietija leido Europos centriniam bankui (ECB) vykdyti ekonomikos stabilizavimo veiksmus mainais už paramos gavėjų "struktūrinių reformų" kontrolę.

Sodrios detalės, neviešinti faktai, "žmogiškas veidas".

“Das ist nicht fair.” That is not fair, the German chancellor said angrily, tears welling in her eyes. “Ich bringe mich nicht selbst um.” I am not going to commit suicide.

For those who witnessed the breakdown in a small conference room in the French seaside resort of Cannes, it was shocking enough to watch Europe’s most powerful and emotionally controlled leader brought to tears.

But the scene was even more remarkable, those present said, for the two objects of her ire: the man sitting next to her, French President Nicolas Sarkozy, and the other across the table, US President Barack Obama.

It would be the low point in a brutal, recrimination-filled night, one many participants would recall as the nadir of the three-year eurozone crisis.

Nelengvas tai buvo procesas... Malonaus skaitymo.

Mark Blyth apie "atsakingąjį taupumą" ir bankų problemas

"Atsakingo taupymo politika" skurdina ekonomikas, o skurdas kerta per realiąją visų privačių finansinių aktyvų vertę. Nuvertėjantys aktyvai kiurdo bankų balansus.

Nemoki finansų sistema svirduliuoja ant bankų panikos ribos. ECB likvidumo operacijos gelbsti, bet problemos nesprendžia.

Tradicinio bankų krizių sprendimo metodo - totalinės fiskalinio suvereno garantijos - eurozona taikyti negali, nes fiskalinio suvereno tiesiog nėra. Niekas neįgaliotas "spausdinti pinigų" tiek, kiek reikia. Faktiškai, toli viršydamas savo įgaliojimus, remdamasis instituciniu autoritetu, tai galėtų daryti nebent ECB, bet "pliusinių" valstybių rinkėjai sužinoję nustebtų.

Galima garantijų sistemą kurti slapta, "už balansų", bet neįgaliotų asmenų slaptų garantijų patikimumas abejotinas.

Eurozona turi struktūrinę problemą.
---

Pasakyti dalykai yra tik kuklus komentaras Mark Blyth valandos paskaitai Google. Lektorius charizmatiškas, šneka tiesi. HT +Arijit Banik.



YouTube esama trumpesnių Mark Blyth įrašų.

Nausėdai: euras - kaip trijų metrų gylio duobė

SEB banko prezidento patarėjas Gitanas Nausėda „Žinių radijo“ laidoje „Atviras pokalbis“ teigė, kad šalies politikų neapsisprendimas dėl euro įvedimo gali brangiai kainuoti.

„Mes įsivaizduojame, kad euro įvedimas yra, jeigu kalbant krepšinio terminais, kažkoks trijų metrų skersmens krepšinio lankas, į kurį kamuolį gali įmesti bet kada. Šiandien nenoriu, įmesiu rytoj... Bet juk taip nėra. Mes šiuo metu turime tikrai labai neblogas sąlygas patekti į euro zoną tiek dėl infliacijos, tiek dėl valstybės skolos, tiek dėl net biudžeto deficito, o rytoj nėra jokių garantijų, kad pasaulyje infliacija neišaugs, Europoje infliacija neišaugs, Lietuvoje infliacija neišaugs... Ji gali išaugti ir mums gali būti labai sunku į tą korsetą įsisprausti 2015 ar 2016 m.“, – perspėjo G.Nausėda.

Perfrazuodamas Gitaną Nausėdą vairavimo terminais, verčiau siūlau eurą įsivaizduoti kaip trijų metrų gylio duobę, kurią kelyje reikia atsargiai apvažiuoti. Nebent trokštume ateities, kurioje vietoje demokratijos būtume "krizės svertais" vairuojami puse lūpų kalbančių ECB statytinių.

Kalbėdamas apie eurozonos bėdas, britų laikraščio Daily Telegraph apžvalgininkas Ambrose Evans-Pritchard paminėjo šiemet italų kalba išleistą knygą "Morire di Austerita". Knygos autorius Lorenzo Bini-Smaghi iki 2011-ųjų lapkričio buvo aukščiausio lygio ECB funkcionieriumi - priklausė ECB vykdomosios tarybos šešetui.

Citata nuo knygos viršelio: "La crisi è soprattutto politica. Riflette l’incapacità delle democrazie occidentali di risolvere problemi accumulati da oltre un ventennio. Chi è eletto democraticamente fa fatica a prendere decisioni impopolari che possono comprometterne la rielezione. L’emergenza diventa così il motore dell’azione politica e il modo per giustificare le manovre correttive di fronte agli elettori, con la conseguenza che la cura - tardiva e varata sotto la pressione dei mercati - diventa ancor più dolorosa e impopolare."

Vertimas (ačiū už pagalbą +Agne Ma): Krizė yra visų pirma politinė. Ji demonstruoja vakarietiškų demokratijų nesugebėjimą spręsti daugiau nei dvidešimt metų besikaupiančias problemas. Demokratiškai išrinktos vyriausybės nesugeba daryti nepopuliarių sprendimų, kurie galėtų neigiamai įtakoti perrinkimą. Todėl krizė tampa politiniu stimulu ir būdu pasiteisinti prieš rinkėjus dėl korekcinių manevrų, duodančių reikiamą rezultatą. Bet pavėluotai, rinkų spaudimo fone vykdomos priemonės būna dar skausmingesnės ir nepopuliarios.

Knyga pateikia problemų, kurių tos "neefektyvios" demokratijos nesugeba "išspręsti", paaiškinimą: Target2 (centrinių bankų tarpusavio garantijų sistemos) disbalansai. Kitaip - pati eurosistemos esmė. Pasirodo, buvusio ECB vykdomosios tarybos nario nuomone, tai "demokratijos problema" ir ją leidžiama spręsti, "spaudžiant krizės svertus".

Kapitalas (bankų įsipareigojimai eurais) eurozonoje, žinote, turi "mobilumo teisę". O patys bankai gali įsipareigoti, kaip tik jiems šauna į galvą. Pavyzdžiui banką valdantys asmenys per statytinius gali įsipareigoti patys sau. Jei nori, gali tą įsipareigojimą perkelti į bet kurį kitą eurozonos banką (pervesti pinigus). Pervedimui įvykus, valstybės balansas Target2 sistemoje pablogėja visa to pervedimo suma. O valstybės, į kurią pinigai "nuėjo", "pagerėja".

(Jeigu toks bankas nusprogtų, ir paaiškėtų, kad pusė jo aktyvų fiktyvūs, anuliuoti tokios operacijos, nepasibylinėjus kelių valstybių teismuose, nebūtų įmanoma.)

Centrinio banko funkcionieriaus politikos supratimas toks: įsiskolinimai, atsirandantys per Target2 tvarkant neaišku kokius reikalus bankams su neaišku kokiais balansais [dar vienas "balansų skylės" paaiškinimas čia], turi būti "aptarnaujami" realaus ekonominio produkto, realios vertės srautais. Politikai privalo tai iš savo ekonomikų išspausti.

Ir apie tai neturi būti viešai kalbama kitaip, kaip apie fiskalinę drausmę. Rekomenduojama reklamuoti būsimą "bankų sąjungą", būsimą bankų priežiūros mechanizmą, būsimą garantinį fondą į kurį per dešimt metų gal bus surinkta 50 milijardų eurų.

Kam nepatinka - pats kaltas. Knygoje atskleidžiami ECB Italijoje inicijuoto politinio perversmo, įvykdyto Berlusconi 2011-aisiais pradėjus konsultacijas dėl Italijos išstojimo iš eurozonos, faktai.

Visų eurozonos šalių Target2 įsipareigojimai Vokietijai - virš pusės trilijono eurų, bankų sistemos balansų skylė - dar ne mažiau trilijono. Knygoje aprašomas epizodas, kaip 2012-aisiais Vokietijos kanclerė Merkel jau buvo susiruošusi išmesti Graikiją iš eurozonos, bet išgirdus paaiškinimą, kokios bus grandininės bankrotų reakcijos, ir kas galiausiai turės mokėti, persigalvojo. Rizika ir įtampos susidarė tokios, kad Target2 prižiūrėtojai Vokietijoje "naktimis nebemiega".

Kadangi tie įsipareigojimai kolektyviniai [dar vienas paaiškinimas čia], Vokietijai palanku, kai juos prisiima daugiau šalių. Kaip ne keista, tai palanku ir naujai prisijungiančiųjų narių elitams.

Propagandos mašinos įjungtos. Bankininkai juodais kostiumais Lietuvoje:
V. Vasiliauskas: neturime teisės dar kartą paleisti vėjais galimybės įsivesti eurą;
G. Nausėda: euro [neįvedimo] klausimas Lietuvai gali brangiai kainuoti;

bet... Vasiliauskas: krizė atskleidė finansų sistemos spragas

Gal manote, kad ponas Vasiliauskas kalba apie sistemines spragas? Besąlygines garantijas, tik po dešimties metų sugalvojant, kad tų garantijų galutiniai naudotojai - bankai - turėtų būti išties, o ne formaliai kontroliuojami?

Žinoma, ne. Spręskite patys:

Pono Vasiliausko teigimu, Europai būtinas toks finansų priežiūros ir reguliavimo priemonių rinkinys, kuris ne tik sustiprintų finansų sistemą, bet ir paskatintų ekonomikos, ypač smulkiojo ir vidutinio verslo, finansavimą.

„Vienas didžiausių ES iššūkių – užtrukęs finansų sistemos susiskaidymas, neigiamai veikiantis ūkio raidą. Tik pašalinę jo priežastis, galėsime atkurti normalų finansų rinkos funkcionavimą ir taip paskatinti ekonomikos atsigavimą. Mūsų įsitikinimu, tai vienas iš svarbiausių Lietuvos pirmininkavimo tikslų, todėl šiandien ir rytoj vykstančiame susitikime išskirtinį dėmesį skirsime bankų sąjungos bei mažųjų ir vidutinių įmonių finansavimo klausimams“, – pranešime cituojamas Lietuvos banko valdybos pirmininkas.

Ambrose Evans-Pritchard žodžiais:

He [Lorenzo Bini-Smaghi - ed.] confirms that Germany is indeed on the hook for €574bn of credits from the Bundesbank to the central banks of Greece, Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Cyprus, and Slovenia.

We have always been assured that the so-called Target2 credits within the ECB's internal payments system is a technical adjustment, without significant risk.

Mr Bini-Smaghi states that any EMU state leaving the euro would face likely default on external obligations. "The national central bank would not be able to repay liabilities accumulated in relation to other members of the euro system, which are registered in the internal payments system of the Union (known as Target2). The insolvency would provoke substantial losses for counter-parties in other eurozone countries, including central banks and states." [...]

This means that if the euro blows up, the Bundesbank still owes this money to the same private banks, which could be Deutsche Bank, but could also be Nomura, Citigroup, or Barclays. This is not fictitious. The Bundesbank cannot default on these securities.

Perhaps I am a bear of very little brain, but I have yet to hear a satisfactory explanation as to how this can be conjured away painlessly, as we are told by a long list of illustrious economists that it can be. I have never seen them answer this issue. They publish long papers, blinding everybody with science as economists are prone to do (usually bluffing), but never get to the core point.

The fact is that Target2 is the flipside of intra-EMU capital flight. Private investors have pulled out of Club Med, dumping their claims onto the taxpayers of Germany and the northern creditor states. Dress this up any way you want, but that is the reality.

Yes, the Bundesbank could print money with gay abandon in such a crisis – and would have to do so to avoid a deflationary shock, and on a much larger scale than anything suggested so far within the EMU construct. Germany would no doubt muddle through, but its monetary doctrines would be shredded.

The Bundesbank's official position is that the Target2 controversy is a storm in a teacup. In fact, they don't believe it themselves. A Bundesbanker with direct responsibility for Target2 said in my presence that he "worries about it every night". The bank's own president Jens Weidmann testified last year that the imbalances are an "unacceptable risk".

I suspect that somebody is trying to pull the wool over the eyes of the German people, and it is not the splendidly outspoken Jens Weidmann.

---
Brad DeLong:
No mystery, guys; you messed up.

Ellen Brown apie Europos bankų atsakomybės slinktį

July 5, 2013 by Ellen Brown
Think Your Money is Safe in an Insured Bank Account? Think Again.

When Dutch Finance Minister Jeroen Dijsselbloem told reporters on March 13, 2013, that the Cyprus deposit confiscation scheme would be the template for future European bank bailouts, the statement caused so much furor that he had to retract it. But the “bail in” of depositor funds is now being made official EU policy. On June 26, 2013, The New York Times reported that EU finance ministers have agreed on a plan that shifts the responsibility for bank losses from governments to bank investors, creditors and uninsured depositors.

Insured deposits (those under €100,000, or about $130,000) will allegedly be “fully protected.” But protected by whom? The national insurance funds designed to protect them are inadequate to cover another system-wide banking crisis, and the court of the European Free Trade Association ruled in the case of Iceland that the insurance funds were not intended to cover that sort of systemic collapse.

Shifting the burden of a major bank collapse from the blameless taxpayer to the blameless depositor is another case of robbing Peter to pay Paul, while the real perpetrators carry on with their risky, speculative banking schemes [...]

Although the bail-in template did not hit the news until it was imposed on Cyprus in March 2013, it is a global model that goes back to a directive from the Financial Stability Board (an arm of the Bank for International Settlements) dated October 2011, endorsed at the G20 summit in December 2011. In 2009, the G20 nations agreed to be regulated by the Financial Stability Board; and bail-in policies have now been established for the US, UK, New Zealand, Australia, and Canada, among other countries. (See earlier articles here and here.)

The EU bail-in plan, which still needs the approval of the European Parliament, would allow European leaders to dodge something they evidently regret having signed, the agreement known as the European Stability Mechanism (ESM). Jeroen Dijsselbloem, who played a leading role in imposing the deposit confiscation plan on Cyprus, said on March 13 that “the aim is for the ESM never to have to be used.”

Passed with little publicity in January 2012, the ESM imposes an open-ended debt on EU member governments, putting taxpayers on the hook for whatever the ESM’s overseers demand. Two days before its ratification on July 1, 2012, the agreement was modified to make the permanent bailout fund cover the bailout of private banks. It was a bankers’ dream – a permanent, mandated bailout of private banks by governments. But EU governments are now balking at that heavy commitment.

In Cyprus, the confiscation of depositor funds was not only approved but mandated by the EU, along with the European Central Bank (ECB) and the IMF. They told the Cypriots that deposits below €100,000 in two major bankrupt banks would be subject to a 6.75 percent levy or “haircut,” while those over €100,000 would be hit with a 9.99 percent “fine.” When the Cyprus national legislature overwhelming rejected the levy, the insured deposits under €100,000 were spared; but it was at the expense of the uninsured deposits, which took a much larger hit, estimated at about 60 percent of the deposited funds [...]

While the insured depositors escaped in Cyprus, they might not fare so well in a bank collapse of the sort seen in 2008-09 [...]

Vienintelis įmanomas bankų "stabilumo mechanizmas" Europoje yra ECB.

Bet ne kontrolės. Pradinis bankų sąjungos planas ir buvo tas dvi funkcijas - draudimą ir kontrolę sujungti po ECB stogu, taip sukuriant vieningą pajėgią europinę bankų sistemą. Tai būtų buvusi grandiozinė reforma su savo politiniais pavojais, kurie visiems pasirodė per dideli.

Todėl konstruojamas simuliakras - pusiau Kipro, pusiau Islandijos pusiau rogės, pusiau vežėčios. Raminančios propagandinės pasakos fone nebaigtą konstrukciją tempia pavargusios ekonomikos kuinas, nors girgžda, bet važiuoja. Iki nuokalnėlės.

Propagandos pergalės. Degradavimas gerėja.

2013 m. birželio 3 d Europos centrinio banko vadovas: atsigavimas – jau čia pat

Europos centriniam bankui (ECB) sušvelninus savo monetarinę politiką ir išaugus paklausai eksporto rinkose, euro zonos ekonomika antrąjį šių metų pusmetį ims atsigauti, apie tai pirmadienį kalbėdamas tarptautinėje finansų konferencijoje Šanchajuje sakė ECB vadovas Mario Draghi.

"Ekonominė situacija euro zonoje tebėra sudėtinga, bet atsirado galimos stabilizacijos požymių, ir nuo antrojo šių metų pusmečio prognozuojamas laipsniškas atsigavimas", - sakė jis.

ECB vadovas taip pat paragino problemines ES šalis dėti daugiau pastangų sumažinti savo šalies biudžeto deficitą.

[...] "Šalys gali vykdyti reformas be OMT ir išsaugoti savo ekonominį suverenumą, arba jos gali pertvarkyti savo ekonomiką su OMT pagalba ir atsisakyti dalies savo ekonominio suverenumo, - M. Draghi žodžius, pasakytus tarptautinėje finansų konferencijoje Šanchajuje, cituoja "Associated Press".

Austerity Blitz: Eurozone Notes From Beyond the Grave
Tuesday, 02 July 2013, by CJ Polychroniou, Truthout

The capacity of the political elite to manipulate public opinion should never be underestimated. A glaring example is the case of Greece, where the government's propaganda in portraying an economic catastrophe and the conversion of a sovereign nation into a banana republic as a "success story" seems to be paying off dividends, as the latest polls show the gap between the conservative party and the Coalition of the Radical Left, or Syriza, widening. French President Francois Hollande, who managed to become the most unpopular French president after only a few months in power, seemed to be following the same route when he declared on a recent trip to Japan that the euro zone crisis is over

[...] leading actors in the EU /.../ opted from the start to seek to exorcise the demons of financial instability and turmoil not through the use of expansionary fiscal policy tools, but by reliance on tough austerity measures and mindless fiscal consolidation. They do this without any consideration at all for the damage these policies inflict on human lives and the social fabric of societies in general. As one major study pointedly reveals, austerity indeed kills.(1)

[...] Lacking a federal structure and a democratic form of governance, the Euroland has evolved into a peculiar type of an empire whereby the core seeks to maintain its privileged position by pursuing policies detrimental to the periphery. Hence the great imbalances in the euro zone and the widening divide between North and South; hence also the conversion of the euro into a currency with a double function: providing a competitive advantage for the advanced nations of the North and serving as an albatross around the neck of the less developed nations of the South.

In the course of the crisis, the core has also attempted to convert the peripherals into colonies as a means of controlling the spread of the crisis throughout the euro zone.

[...] policies pursued by Brussels and Berlin are depriving the indebted euro zone member states of their sovereign status and are making a mockery of democratic processes and institutions.

As things stand, the euro zone is doomed to collapse. It lacks a banking or fiscal union and its hegemon is playing the role of a debt collector - all while national economies are collapsing and human lives are being destroyed.

Užbalansiniai Mario Draghi stebuklai

Corruption, EuroStyle: ECB Chief Draghi Fudged Italy’s Books to Secure Eurozone Entry, Italy Stuck With Derivative Losses

As readers of the financial press may recall, there was a kerfluffle over the fact that Greece had used a currency trades designed by Goldman in 2001 to mask the level of its indebtedness and secure Eurozone entry. Goldman continued to help Greece dress up its books and offered to intervene in 2009, although Greece turned them down then. [...]

A new story by Financial Times shows that Draghi and the ECB had far more to hide than the Greece scandal. It appears Draghi was directly involved in arranging similar, much larger transactions for Italy while Draghi was the director general of the Bank of Italy, in 1999. Draghi then went to Goldman. The FT also reports that Draghi’s deputy on these deals, who left the Bank of Italy in 2000, returned as director general in 2012 with Draghi’s support. Sure looks like payback time.
The scandal is coming to a head now because the Italian government is set to lose billions of euros as a result of restructuring of derivatives, including the 1999 derivatives, at the worst of the crisis. The FT stresses that all the details are not known, but the losses look to be troubling:

The report does not specify the potential losses Italy faces on the restructured contracts. But three independent experts consulted by the FT calculated the losses based on market prices on June 20 and concluded the Treasury was facing a potential loss at that moment of about €8bn, a surprisingly high figure based on a notional value of €31.7bn.

The names of the banks involved in these transactions have not been disclosed, but previous reports show that Morgan Stanley and JP Morgan have been among the Italy’s counterparties.
There are two, possibly three, ugly implications.
First, the revelation that Italy is facing previously undisclosed derivative losses comes at a time when periphery Eurozone countries are again under stress, including Italy. From Ambrose Evans-Pritchard today at the Telegraph:

Mediobanca, Italy’s second biggest bank, said its “index of solvency risk” for Italy was already flashing warning signs as the worldwide bond rout continued into a second week, pushing up borrowing costs…
The report warned that Italy will “inevitably end up in an EU bail-out request” over the next six months, unless it can count on low borrowing costs and a broader recovery….
Italy’s €2.1 trillion (£1.8 trillion) debt is the world’s third largest after the US and Japan….Italian 10-year yields spiked to 4.8pc, up 100 basis points since the Fed began to toughen its language in May. But Mediobanca is particularly concerned about the gap that has emerged between yields on short-term bills (BOTs) and longer-term bonds (BTPs) near maturity that expire at the same time. BOTs retiring on July 31 are trading at a yield of 0.48, while the equivalent BTP is trading at 0.74pc. The reason is that BOTs are protected from debt restructuring….
Mediobanca said the trigger for a blow-up in Italy could be a bail-out crisis for Slovenia or an ugly turn of events in Argentina, which has close links to Italian business. “Argentina in particular worries us, as a new default seems likely.”

Second is that given Draghi’s involvement in Italian books-cooking, it seems even more implausible than before that he did not know of the Greece deals with Goldman.
Third is that if Goldman was one of the counterparties to Italy when Draghi was at the helm of the Italian central bank, his subsequent employment looks an awful lot like a payoff.
The Bank of Italy and the ECB are certain to fight tooth and nail to defect questions about Draghi and might not be above using market stresses as part of their excuses for stonewalling. But the magnitude of these losses may galvanize the Italian public. The matter is now in the hands of the state auditors and the financial police, so how far this goes will also be a function of how they operate in the face of large public scandals.

Čekijos centrinis bankas atmetė ECB senjoražo "pasiūlymus"

Centriniai bankai neprivalo turėti jų įsipareigojimus viršijančio turto - savo koordinacines funkcijas gali puikiai atlikti turėdami bet kokio dydžio neigiamą kapitalą. O jeigu galima dirbti be užsienio atsargų, kyla pagrįstas klausimas, kokio velnio centriniam bankui jas kaupti.

Pavyzdžiui Lietuvos bankas deklaruoja šiuo metu turįs ~19 mlrd.lt vertės tarptautinių atsargų. Kas nors suvokia, kam jos reikalingos? Valiutos stabilumui palaikyti? Ar tikrai verta vardan itin stabilaus lito kurso ne itin stabilaus euro atžvilgiu laikyti įšaldžius tokias atsargas? Kai 2009-ųjų pradžioje, paties didžiausio krizės nuosmukio metu, Lietuvai vadovaujantys tešlagalviai priėmė "herojišką" sprendimą "išlaikyti valiutos stabilumą", ar LB atsargos buvo kam nors panaudotos?

Ne. "Stabilumą išlaikė" sužlugdydami ekonomiką ir praskolindami valstybę. Centrinio banko atsargų piršteliu paliest nedrįso.

Sveiko proto testas: a) užsienio skola auga, b) centrinis bankas prisisūdęs užsienio aktyvų. Ką daryti?

Mokomės iš Čekijos (Dirk Ehnts):

There was a dispute some time ago between the ECB and the Czech Central Bank, which is described by Karl Wheelan in paper from November 2012:

The final argument, which Buiter and Rahbari advocate as a more convincing one, is perhaps best illustrated via an ongoing dispute between the ECB and the Czech National Bank. The Eurosystem has no legal requirement that its participating central banks have positive capital. Nonetheless, in its 2010 and 2012 Convergence Reports, the ECB has admonished the Czech National Bank because it has a negative capital position. Specifically, ECB (2010) recommends that the negative capital situation should be rectified “in order to comply with the principle of financial independence.”
According to this argument, negative capital compromises a central bank’s independence because it requires them at some point to request funds from the government to restore their positive capital position. Governments could then look for more influence over monetary policy in return for honouring this request. However, this is a completely circular argument. It relies on the assumption that positive central bank capital is required, so central banks must request recapitalisation and have their independence compromised. If positive capital is not required, then no request for recapitalisation is required and independence is not compromised.
Consistent with this point, the Czech National Bank has issued a statement (CNB, 2010) to say that it considers the ECB’s statement “completely unacceptable”. Specifically, it notes that “Throughout its existence, its capital position has never undermined its independence or limited its decision-making and operational capacity in any way. The CNB is therefore convinced that there can be no doubt about its legal and factual independence. Negative capital presents no problem for the CNB, and the central bank is able to meet its obligations.”

Lietuvis, prisiklausęs pasakų apie lito padengimą užsienio aktyvais ir savarankiškos centrinio banko politikos negalimumą turėtų krist iš kėdės iš pavydo. Čekams galima, o mums ne? Kodėl?

(Todėl, kad pinigų politikos prioritetą teikiant ne nacionaliniams, o neaišku kieno interesams, nebegalima nieko - negalima CB aktyvų investuoti neaptarnaujant svetimo senjoražo, negalima valstybinio sektoriaus lėšų nelaikyti užsienio savininkų bankuose, negalima turėti valstybinio komercinio banko).

Neseniai į akį krito 'interfluidity' Steve Randy Waldman replika neigiamo CB kapitalo adresu. Monetary policy for the 21st century:

There is a theory that the value of a currency is somehow related to the strength of the issuing central bank’s balance sheet, so a currency issued against fictional “goodwill” would quickly become worthless. Suffice it to say that, with respect to non-redeemable fiat currencies, there is absolutely no evidence for this theory. There is no evidence, for example, that the purchasing power of the US dollar has any relationship whatsoever to the Fed’s holdings of gold or foreign exchange reserves. The assets of existing central banks are mostly loans denominated in the currency the bank itself can produce at will. You may argue that those assets are nevertheless “real”, because repayments to the central bank will be with money earned from real activity. But that assumes what we are trying to explain, that people are willing surrender real goods and services in exchange for the bank’s scrip. Perhaps fiat currency derives its value from coercive taxation by government, as the MMT-ers maintain. Perhaps the imprimatur of the state serves as an arbitrary focal point for the coordination equilibrium required for a common medium of exchange. I don’t know what makes fiat currency valuable, but I do know that the real asset portfolio of the issuing central bank has very little to do with it.

Žinia, kai ekonominė teorija trukdo kreivai realybei, realybei nuo to nei šilta, nei šalta.

So, there is no problem with negative equity at the ECB, it seems. It’s just that the rules – once again – that had been put into place do not allow the ECB to function properly as a central bank. Without a major change in the rules regarding the ECB the crisis will never stop. The existing system is faulty and only “works” because Mario Draghi broke the rules. “Works” means here that the financial system does not collapse. However, the problems in the real economy are still there. The euro zone is in recession, some countries have mass unemployment and young people face the worst job market since the end of WW II.

Yra įvairių argumentų. Norint iš čekų ko išmokti, reikėtų galvoti. Galvojimas eikvoja energiją. Šuo kariamas pripranta.